The Middle East is a crucible of shifting alliances and enduring rivalries, none more central to its geopolitical landscape than the protracted, often overt, conflict between Israel and Iran. Recent escalations, including direct military confrontations in 2025, have brought this long-standing animosity into sharp focus. When discussing Israel’s strategic approach, the term “separation” is crucial to clarify. This is not about territorial division but rather a comprehensive, multi-faceted grand strategy aimed at fundamentally diminishing Iran’s power, influence, and capabilities. This strategy seeks to isolate Iran regionally, cripple its nuclear ambitions, dismantle its network of proxies, and thereby consolidate Israel’s own position as the preeminent regional power, neutralizing what it perceives as an existential threat.

The recent direct military confrontations in June 2025, including Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” and Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes, mark a dramatic shift from shadow warfare to overt conflict, raising urgent questions about the motivations and broader implications of Israel’s long-term strategy towards Iran.¹ This strategic objective, termed “separation,” signifies Israel’s aim to isolate, weaken, and neutralize Iran as a regional threat. It encompasses preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, eroding its regional influence, and degrading its military capabilities, rather than a literal territorial division.¹

Historically, the relationship between Iran and Israel was cordial for most of the Cold War, with Iran being the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel after Turkey. Under the pro-Western Shah, Iran was a close ally of the West and played a critical role in containing communism.⁶ However, this dynamic dramatically worsened after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which brought Ali Khomeini’s Shiite revolution to power, transforming Iran from a pro-Western monarchy into an anti-Western Islamic republic.¹ This ideological shift led Iran to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and adopt a directly confrontational stance, framing Israel as a colonial outpost and illegitimate presence. By the early 1990s, the relationship transitioned from a “cold peace” to open hostility.⁶

The redefinition of Israel’s approach as “separation” rather than mere “containment” underscores a more aggressive, proactive posture. This aims to fundamentally alter Iran’s regional standing and capabilities, moving beyond simply managing existing influence to actively dismantling it. This redefinition is essential for understanding the depth and multifaceted nature of Israel’s actions, which extend far beyond simple military strikes to encompass a comprehensive geopolitical re-engineering.

The Genesis of a Doctrine: From Begin to Netanyahu’s “Greater Israel”

Israel’s current posture towards Iran is not an ad-hoc reaction but the culmination of decades of strategic thought, deeply rooted in its national security doctrines. This evolution traces back to foundational principles of pre-emptive defense, significantly shaped by key political figures and geopolitical shifts.

In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin established the principle of pre-emptive defense, informally known as the “Begin Doctrine.” This doctrine aims to prevent any potential enemy state in the Middle East from developing weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.¹ This principle became a cornerstone of Israeli defense policy, ensuring no other state actor in the region would be allowed to experiment with nuclear strategic interests. The doctrine yielded tangible results in the past against Iraq, notably the 1981 strike on the Osirak reactor, and against Egypt.¹

The 1979 Iranian Revolution profoundly altered the regional balance. The newly established Islamic Republic adopted an explicitly anti-Western and anti-Israeli foreign policy. This ideological shift led Iran to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and adopt a directly confrontational stance, establishing the “Axis of Resistance” as a geo-strategic containment policy made up of paramilitary armies and organizations.¹ In response, Iran’s “Forward Defense” doctrine emerged, leveraging a network of regional proxies and a missile program to compensate for conventional military weaknesses and project power indirectly, threatening Israel’s borders from multiple fronts.¹

Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach is deeply informed by Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s Revisionist Zionism thesis, which advocates for an “Iron Wall” separating Judaic Israel from Arab states and implicitly, a “Greater Israel”.¹ His 1993 book, “A Place Among the Nations,” served not only as a manifesto for his personal geopolitical interpretation of Israel’s position in the Middle East but also as a justification for a course of aggression against Iran.¹ Netanyahu’s “accelerationism” represents a paradigm shift, possibly adhering more closely to Jabotinsky’s ideas than Begin did, pushing for decisive, pre-emptive action.¹

The convergence of the Begin Doctrine (focused on pre-emptive WMD strikes) and Netanyahu’s “Greater Israel” vision (emphasizing an aggressive posture and regional dominance) has justified increasingly overt and direct military action against Iran. While Israel’s “War Between the Wars” (MABAM) doctrine provided the toolkit for operations “between wars,” the launch of “Operation Rising Lion” in 2025 signals a willingness to cross the threshold into “regular war”.¹ This indicates that the “separation” strategy is becoming more aggressive and less covert. This shift from proxy warfare and “shadow” operations to direct conventional strikes points to a higher risk tolerance from Israel, which could lead to more frequent and intense escalations.

Israel’s strategy has evolved to the “War Between the Wars” (MABAM) doctrine, which involves targeted strikes on Iranian soil against nuclear and ballistic missile assets whenever Iran attempts to restore damaged infrastructure.⁸ This is a long-term strategy to systematically degrade Iran’s capabilities without triggering a full-scale war.⁸ In June 2025, this confrontation escalated into a “full regular war” with Netanyahu launching “Operation Rising Lion,” performing surgical air raids on Iran’s Natanz, Isfahan, and Tehran nuclear facilities, sparking vast missile retaliations from Iran.¹ This operation had key goals: setting back Iran’s nuclear program, eliminating ballistic missiles, and restricting Iran’s regional power projection. An implicit aim was also to destabilize the Iranian government or pave the way for regime change, citing the Islamic Republic’s fragility.³

The framing of Iran as an “existential threat” provides a continuous and powerful justification for pre-emptive and aggressive actions. The Begin Doctrine was fundamentally about preventing weapons of mass destruction, and in the post-October 7th world, an Iranian nuclear bomb is explicitly viewed as an “existential risk” to Israeli security.¹ This narrative makes de-escalation difficult, as any perceived Iranian progress, whether in its nuclear program or regional influence, can be framed as an immediate, intolerable danger requiring military intervention, thereby perpetuating the conflict cycle.

Table 1: Key Israeli Doctrines and Operations against Iran (Historical & Current)

Pillars of Israel’s “Separation” Strategy

Israel’s strategy to “separate” Iran is multi-pronged, targeting both Iran’s core capabilities (nuclear program) and its regional projection of power (proxy network), while simultaneously seeking to reshape the regional order in its favor.

A. Degrading Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

Israel’s motivations for recent strikes against Iran’s nuclear program are multifaceted. Israeli decision-makers believed they were “almost out of time” to stop an Iranian nuclear bomb, viewing it as an “existential risk” in the wake of the October 7th events.² With dimming prospects for a U.S.-negotiated nuclear deal with Iran, military action was perceived as the “only viable option” for preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear-weapons capability.² The strikes represented a convergence of several factors: Iran’s nuclear program reaching “dangerous thresholds” (60% uranium enrichment) and the strategic window created by the weakened state of Hezbollah following the assassination of its chief.²

In June 2025, Israel launched “Operation Rising Lion,” performing surgical air raids on Iran’s Natanz, Isfahan, and Tehran nuclear facilities.¹ Specific targets included uranium conversion facilities in Isfahan, which were reportedly “wiped out”.⁹ Efforts were also made to disrupt access to the underground Fordow enrichment site, with entrance tunnels reportedly collapsed.⁴ Beyond physical infrastructure, Israeli operations involved the pinpoint targeting and assassination of numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists.³

Assessments of the efficacy of these strikes vary. While Israel claimed “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear program ¹⁰, early intelligence assessments from the Defense Intelligence Agency suggested the strikes may have only set back Iran’s program for “months”.⁹ Key Iranian nuclear facilities were “severely damaged” ⁵, and a “significant scientific infrastructure” was destroyed, along with depleted missile stockpiles.⁹ However, underground sites like Fordow are difficult to destroy with conventional bombs, and it would require “significant effort” for Iran to access damaged centrifuges.⁴ Crucially, Iran still retains 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, which could be used to build about 10 nuclear weapons if enriched to 90%.⁹

The goal of Israel’s strategy is to “eliminate” the threat ⁸, but expert consensus indicates that any strike in and of itself only “delays” rather than “permanently stops” Iran’s nuclear program.² The continued existence of a substantial stockpile of 60% enriched uranium is a critical indicator of this limitation. This implies that military action alone cannot permanently resolve the nuclear issue and may instead create a “slow attrition” scenario, requiring sustained pressure and potentially leading to more frequent, albeit limited, military engagements.

Israel is preparing to apply its “War Between the Wars” (MABAM) doctrine directly to Iran, entailing targeted strikes whenever Iran attempts to restore damaged infrastructure.⁸ The long-term goal is to “systematically degrade Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons” and force Tehran to reconsider the feasibility and cost of its program.⁸ This “mowing the grass” doctrine aims to delay or disrupt ambitions without triggering a full-scale war, though it carries inherent risks of cycles of mutual escalation.⁸

Beyond the stated goal of nuclear setback, Israeli officials also noted that the strikes could “destabilize the Iranian government or even pave the way for regime change,” highlighting the Islamic Republic’s fragility and encouraging the Iranian people to rise up against their rulers.³ This suggests a more ambitious, implicit aim beyond just the nuclear program, leveraging internal fragilities to achieve broader political objectives. This dual objective complicates the conflict, turning military actions into tools for political leverage and potentially exacerbating internal Iranian discontent, but also risking unpredictable and more severe Iranian responses if the regime feels existentially threatened.

Table 2: Assessment of Israeli Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Key Targets & Outcomes)

B. Dismantling Iran’s Regional Influence and Proxy Network

Israel’s strategy also heavily focuses on dismantling Iran’s regional influence and its extensive network of proxies. This involves targeting Iran’s support for non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as its military presence and influence in Syria and Iraq.²

Iran’s influence has “waned significantly” following key developments such as the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and extensive Israeli strikes on Iran and its regional proxies over the past couple of years.³ Israel has dealt “significant blows” to Iran’s proxy network, particularly Hezbollah, and has also targeted Iran’s air defense capabilities.² The weakening of Iran’s proxies is cited as a key factor that emboldened Israel to escalate to direct strikes on Iran.² This suggests a strategic window of opportunity perceived by Israel, where successes in the proxy war created conditions for a more direct confrontation. This creates a feedback loop where successful proxy degradation leads to direct action, which in turn might further weaken proxies or provoke new Iranian strategies.

Israel’s decision to strike directly at Iran, rather than solely relying on proxy warfare, signals a “fundamental shift from shadow warfare to overt confrontation”.² This indicates an emboldened and more assertive Israel, willing to act decisively and unilaterally to prevent the emergence of threats in its surroundings.¹⁴

Syria has emerged as a strategic fulcrum in this broader contest. Israel’s interest in Syria is primarily defined by preventing Iranian resurgence, halting Hezbollah rearmament, and maintaining military dominance over Syria’s air and ground theaters.¹⁴ However, there is a paradox in Israel’s assertive actions in Syria. While Israel aims to prevent Iranian resurgence, its “expanding territorial foothold” and “frequent airstrikes” are viewed by US regional allies as potentially destabilizing the region and creating “new openings for Iranian and Hezbollah reentry”.¹⁴ This contradiction highlights that Israel’s aggressive actions, while intended to “separate” Iran from Syria, might inadvertently create a vacuum or resentment that Iran could exploit for re-entrenchment, underscoring the complex and often counterproductive nature of military-first approaches.

C. Fostering a New Regional Order

In the wake of recent conflicts, a new US-favored regional order is emerging in the Middle East, centered around Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states (primarily Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar).¹⁴ This architecture largely reshapes regional dynamics “at Iran’s expense”.¹⁴ Despite internal differences, these pillars share a common interest in containing Iran.¹⁴ The Iranian ascendancy following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and during subsequent regional uprisings created a rare moment of alignment between Israel and Sunni Arab states.¹⁴

However, deep-rooted rivalries, divergent threat perceptions, and competing ambitions among these three pillars raise serious questions about the model’s internal cohesion and long-term viability.¹⁴ Key points of friction include the persistent Palestinian question, Syria as a contested arena of influence, and the Kurdish issue.¹⁴ Israel’s military dominance may provoke Turkish pushback or Gulf recalibration.¹⁴

While there is a “shared interest in containing Iran,” the “pillars remain fundamentally misaligned on key strategic issues”.¹⁴ This indicates that the anti-Iran front is a coalition of convenience rather than deep strategic alignment, making it vulnerable to rupture. The Palestinian question and Israeli assertiveness are significant fault lines that can easily disrupt this fragile alignment. This suggests that Israel’s “separation” strategy, while weakening Iran, may simultaneously undermine the very regional alliances it seeks to foster, creating new instabilities and limiting its diplomatic reach.

Normalization efforts, such as the Abraham Accords in 2020, represented a culmination of alignment between Israel and Sunni Arab states.¹³ However, the Hamas attack of October 7th and Israel’s subsequent devastating military campaign in Gaza “halted the momentum toward normalization,” particularly with Saudi Arabia.¹⁰ Public outcry in Jordan and Morocco over ties with Israel also constrained normalization efforts, demonstrating the deep public sentiment that can impact government policies.¹⁰ The Gaza War’s impact on normalization efforts illustrates how immediate, intense conflicts can directly undermine long-term strategic goals. This shows the interconnectedness of regional issues, where Israel’s focus on one aspect of its “separation” strategy (military action against Hamas/proxies) can inadvertently derail other crucial pillars (diplomatic isolation of Iran via normalization), highlighting the complex trade-offs and unintended consequences in regional policy.

Iran’s Resilience and Counter-Strategies

Despite facing significant military setbacks and strategic pressure, Iran has demonstrated resilience, relying on a multi-dimensional approach to maintain its strategic depth and deter adversaries.

Iran leverages a network of regional proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, as a “forward-deployed deterrent posture” capable of threatening Israel’s borders from multiple fronts.² It also possesses a “vast arsenal of thousands of missiles that can range Israel”.² However, Israeli attacks have “drastically depleted” its missile stockpiles, and its production capacity is currently insufficient to sustain current rates of fire.⁹ Iran also employs asymmetric tools such as cyberattacks, sabotage, and terrorism.²

The recent conflict has exposed a “deterrence dilemma” for Iran. Its proxies were “badly damaged” ² and “largely stood aside” ¹³ during the recent warfare, indicating a failure of its proxy-based deterrence and exposing a “strategic vulnerability”.² While Iran’s immediate conventional response to Israeli strikes has been “restrained” ², if it perceives an existential threat, it might implement “less constrained responses,” especially if strikes continue.² This creates a critical juncture for Iran: either it accepts a diminished deterrence capacity or it escalates its response, potentially by accelerating its nuclear program or directly using its missile arsenal more extensively, thereby increasing the risk of a wider war.

Iran is actively working to rebuild its air defense network, which was “obliterated” by the Israeli Air Force.⁸ It has launched urgent diplomatic efforts with several countries to accelerate this process.⁸ There is also an expectation that Iran will accelerate efforts to rebuild proxy capabilities following their weakening.²

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly feels “more vulnerable than ever”.⁸ Official Iranian statements, however, emphasize “resistance to the U.S. and Israel,” invoking ideology and nationalism to frame its position as “quasi-successful defiance”.¹⁶ Iran is pursuing a “multi-dimensional strategy: It is rearming, preserving ambiguity, remaining committed to its long-term goals and applying a doctrine of ‘cumulative deterrence'”.⁸

Expert assessments suggest that Israel’s strikes, while intended to set back Iran’s nuclear program, could paradoxically “alter its strategic calculus and prompt it to pursue nuclear weapons despite the associated risks”.² The conflict may “incentivize Iran to double down on achieving a nuclear-weapons capability”.² This direct causal link suggests that the intended outcome (nuclear setback) might lead to the opposite (accelerated pursuit). This highlights a significant strategic risk for Israel: its actions, while militarily effective in the short term, could inadvertently push Iran past the nuclear threshold, creating a more dangerous long-term security environment. There is a widespread belief among Western and regional officials that Iran will try to “play for time in negotiations and will secretly rebuild as much as it can”.¹⁰ The IAEA’s report before the strikes declared Iran non-compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹⁰

Despite the cancellation of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, Iran’s Foreign Minister stated Tehran still sought a deal.⁴ However, relations between Iran and the IAEA have gone from “acrimonious to hostile”.³

International Dimensions and Regional Implications

The Israel-Iran rivalry is not a bilateral affair; it is deeply intertwined with the interests and policies of global and regional powers, shaping the broader stability of the Middle East.

The United States broadly endorses Israel’s initiative in the emerging regional order.¹⁴ It deployed major military assets, including fighter wings, aircraft carrier battle groups, and air defense batteries, providing “direct US support” to Israel’s missile defense.¹² US and Israeli officials have established a “new normal,” threatening further military action if Iran attempts to advance its nuclear program.¹³ President Trump explicitly expressed readiness to order new strikes “without question” if Iran enriches uranium to critical levels.¹¹ This consistent backing, coupled with the US no longer pursuing a two-state solution, essentially gives Israel a license to keep striking and act decisively and unilaterally.¹⁰ This dynamic reduces external constraints on Israel’s aggressive “separation” strategy, potentially leading to a more volatile region as Israel feels less need for consensus or diplomatic restraint. Trump officials aim to leverage the momentum from the Iran-Israel ceasefire to broker a resolution in Gaza and expand the Abraham Accords.¹³

Key European leaders, including Germany’s Chancellor, France’s President, the G7, and the EU Commission President, largely supported Israel’s “right to defend itself”.¹⁷ Germany’s Chancellor notably stated Israel was “doing the dirty work for all of us”.¹⁷ However, their approach is criticized for violating international law, being hypocritical (e.g., failing to uphold JCPOA obligations, refusing to recognize Iran’s right to self-defense, double standards in condemning attacks), and lacking strategic foresight or leverage.¹⁷ Their support for Israeli and US strikes indirectly legitimizes preventive war doctrines.¹⁷ European leaders condemn Iran’s actions, such as supplying drones to Russia, but simultaneously support Israeli actions that violate international law and undermine ongoing diplomacy.¹⁷ This perceived double standard erodes Europe’s credibility as a neutral mediator or a proponent of international law, reducing its influence in future regional conflicts and potentially encouraging other actors to disregard international norms.

Gulf Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) share a “shared interest in containing Iran” ¹⁴ and welcome the decline of Iran’s regional influence.¹³ They have leaned on US backing and Israeli deterrence against the Iran-led axis.¹⁴ However, they were “alarmed” by the recent conflict’s potential to trigger a wider war ¹⁸ and are uneasy about Israel’s “rising unpredictability” and “militarily heavy-handed” policies.¹³ The perception of an unstable ceasefire threatens their economic diversification programs.¹³ While the Abraham Accords aimed to foster regional integration against Iran, the recent Gaza conflict “halted the momentum” and even caused “public outcry”.¹⁰ Gulf states, while welcoming Iran’s weakening, also fear Israeli hegemony.¹³ This indicates that Israel’s military assertiveness, while achieving some “separation” from Iran, simultaneously fragments the very regional order it seeks to build. This pursuit of “separation” through military means risks undermining the broader goal of regional stability and integration, creating a Middle East that is less unified and more susceptible to new forms of rivalry and instability. Gulf states seek to maintain diplomatic and economic engagement with Iran and expand ties with Turkey to “counter an emerging Israeli regional hegemony”.¹³

Iran’s powerful partners, Russia and China, offered “no more than rhetorical support” during the recent warfare.¹³ The ceasefire was a “relief for China,” which can now buy more Iranian oil without sanctions and secure future reconstruction contracts.¹¹ China condemned Israel’s attacks but stopped short of explicitly mediating, exposing its “lack of leverage” over both Iran and Israel.¹¹

The uncertainty over Iran’s capabilities and the potential for further Israeli action is expected to “impede efforts to resolve existing conflicts and further destabilize the region”.¹⁰ The conflict diverted international attention from the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.¹⁰ Neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt are concerned about potential influxes of Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, which could destabilize their nations.¹⁰ Iraq and Jordan also worry about the conflict diverting attention from Syria.¹⁰ The prospect of a “forever war” alarms Israel’s neighbors.¹⁰ The Palestinian issue remains a “fundamental fault line” ¹⁴, straining Israeli-Arab and Turkish-Israeli ties.¹⁴ The Gaza war significantly halted normalization efforts ¹⁴, and public outcry in Jordan and Morocco over ties with Israel demonstrates the deep public sentiment.¹⁰

Table 3: Regional Actors’ Stances and Interests in the Iran-Israel Conflict

Conclusion: The Unfolding Dynamics of a High-Stakes Rivalry

Israel’s strategy to “separate” Iran, rooted in historical doctrines and intensified by recent geopolitical shifts, represents a determined effort to neutralize a perceived existential threat. Recent military operations have demonstrated Israel’s capacity to inflict significant damage and delay Iran’s nuclear program, particularly its surface-level infrastructure and scientific capabilities.¹ These actions have also weakened Iran’s regional influence and its proxy network.²

However, the efficacy of these actions in achieving a permanent “separation” remains debatable. Expert assessments suggest that these military interventions may only delay, not halt, Iran’s nuclear ambitions.² Moreover, there is a substantial concern that these strikes could inadvertently incentivize Iran to accelerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons.² Iran retains significant capabilities, including a large missile arsenal and nuclear expertise, demonstrating considerable resilience despite setbacks.²

The “new normal” of direct military confrontation ² and the application of the “mowing the grass” doctrine ⁸ carry inherent risks of “cycles of mutual escalation”.⁸ Israel’s “bold and offensive posture” and its “mowing the grass” doctrine are designed to deter but inherently risk self-perpetuating conflict.⁸ This suggests that without a fundamental shift in strategy from either side or robust external mediation, the region is likely to remain locked in a pattern of recurring conflict, hindering development and exacerbating humanitarian crises. The possibility of Iran pursuing nuclear weapons or implementing “less constrained responses” poses a constant threat of wider conflict that alarms its neighbors.²

Diplomacy is widely seen as the “most reliable way to keep the war from reigniting”.³ A comprehensive deal that addresses nuclear concerns and fortifies a truce into a non-aggression understanding is deemed necessary for regional stabilization.³ However, the current diplomatic environment is challenging, with relations between Iran and the IAEA described as “acrimonious to hostile”.³ Furthermore, the divergence between the perceived necessity of diplomacy and the ongoing military momentum creates a significant challenge for de-escalation. While experts and some international actors call for diplomacy, Israel’s “accelerationism” and its willingness to act decisively and unilaterally suggest a preference for military solutions.¹ This implies that a sustained peace will require a strong, coordinated international effort to shift the strategic calculus of both Israel and Iran away from military confrontation.

The conflict has profoundly reshaped the regional landscape, fostering a new, albeit fragile, US-favored order. However, Israel’s assertive military actions and the unresolved Palestinian question continue to create friction points and undermine broader normalization efforts, leading to a complex and often contradictory regional dynamic. The limited roles of global powers like China and Russia, coupled with Europe’s constrained influence due to perceived double standards, underscore the regionalization of the conflict and the challenges for external mediation.

Ultimately, while Israel has demonstrated its military dominance and commitment to its “separation” strategy, the path to lasting stability in the region remains elusive without robust diplomatic engagement that addresses core security concerns and underlying grievances. The future of Iran-Israel relations will continue to be a defining factor in the Middle East’s geopolitical trajectory, likely characterized by a “slow attrition of Iran’s military capabilities” rather than a swift resolution, with the prospect of a “forever war” remaining a significant concern for regional actors.⁸